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This article investigates whether the perceived threat of terrorism explains the support
for right-wing Eurosceptic parties and Euroscepticism above and beyond other relevant
variables, including perceived economic and immigration threats. We first examined
the entire Eurobarometer samples of 2014 and 2015, and then conducted survey
experiments in four European Union (EU) countries, that is, United Kingdom (N = 197),
France (N = 164), Italy (N = 312), and Romania (N = 144). Our findings suggest that
the perceived threat of terrorism has a small effect on the negative attitudes toward the
EU above and beyond the effect of immigration and economic threats and other basic
control variables. The relationship between these variables varies across countries and
it is less linear than we might expect.
Keywords: intergroup attitudes, threat, political support, Euroscepticism, far-right
INTRODUCTION
Euroscepticism is a loosely defined transnational socio-political movement, often associated with
populist political parties, that implies rejection of the European integration project and the
opposition to one’s country joining or remaining a member of the European Union (EU, Taggart
and Szczerbiak, 2004). Especially after the so-called Brexit referendum of June 24, 2016, identifying
the specific drivers of Euroscepticism has become increasingly important for both academics and
political analysts. For the EU states and its citizens, Euroscepticism threatens to undermine the
unity of the EU at a time when Europe faces complex challenges, including the Brexit process,
terrorist threats, military conflicts in bordering regions, economic and financial adjustments, and
changing immigration flows. These challenges may themselves increase support for Eurosceptic
parties that threaten the existence of the European Union as we know it today.
In this article, we examine the role of the threat of terrorism in the context of other threats.
Based on media reports and emerging research, it is plausible that the threat of terrorism may have
played a role in increasing the electoral support for Euroscepticism and right-wing Eurosceptic
parties: for example, the results of the 2015 French regional elections might suggest that electoral
support for the right-wing Eurosceptic National Front increased in the wake of the Paris terrorist
attacks (Viette and Todd, 2015). However, rigorous research looking at European attitudes before
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and after the Paris terrorist attacks shows that there is no evidence
of average impacts across a range of issues, from xenophobia,
political attitudes and policy preferences (Castanho Silva, 2018).
Similarly, a subsequent study found no evidence of the impact of
the 2016 Berlin terrorist attack on anti-immigration, anti-refugee
and anti-European Union sentiment (Larsen et al., 2019).
There is extensive research on the factors that can help
explain negative views of the EU, such as those associated
with right-wing Euroscepticism; these factors include socio-
demographic individual characteristics and political orientation
(Gabel and Palmer, 1995), national pride (Carey, 2002), and
economic expectations (Serricchio et al., 2013). Negative attitudes
toward the EU were also found to be associated with religious
intolerance and anti-Muslim sentiment (Hobolt et al., 2011),
anti-immigration attitudes, and perceived immigrant threat
(Riek et al., 2006).
Building on research on the effect of various threats on
intergroup relations, the aim of this article is to investigate the
relationships between perceived threats (i.e., terrorism, but also
economic and immigration) and support for Euroscepticism and
right-wing Eurosceptic parties. Our study focuses on 2014 and
2015, which are the years immediately before the build-up to the
Brexit referendum that changed the perception and meaning of
Euroscepticism in the whole European Union. As a background
to our research, we start by discussing the effect of different types
of threats on Euroscepticism, then argue that so far the effect of
terrorism threats has not been given the attention it deserves in
the literature on Euroscepticism.
Perceived Threat and Political Attitudes
Previous research found a stable significant association
between perceived threat, particularly immigration threat,
and political attitudes. Surveys collected in the United Kingdom
after the Brexit referendum suggest that there is a direct
association between anti-immigration and anti-EU views,
especially among low-income and unemployed voters, those
living in low-skilled areas, and with lower education levels
(Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016; Ashcroft and Bevir, 2016;
Wright et al., 2016). Perceived immigration threat was found
to predict voting for right-wing Eurosceptic parties over
and above other factors, such as individual characteristics
and socio-economic contexts (Werts et al., 2012). This is
not surprising, because in their rhetoric, such parties do
not only seek to distance their country from the European
project, but also argue for restrictive immigration policies, and
usually express prejudice toward immigrants (Treib, 2014).
Prior research has consistently found associations between
policy attitudes such as support for exclusionary policies,
expulsion of immigrants from the EU, and perceived threats of
immigration and economic downfall (McLaren, 2003). More
generally, McLaren and Johnson (2007) found that economic
and immigration threats have predicted anti-immigration
hostility in the United Kingdom, and Pereira et al. (2009)
found that perceptions of threat (especially realistic threat,
i.e., related to crime and economic hardships) mediated
the relationship between prejudice and discrimination of
immigrants in Europe.
Anti-immigration attitudes and intergroup processes
(including attitudes toward outgroups), drive the association
between different forms of perceived threat and political
preferences (such as support for anti-immigration policies
and right-wing political parties). Drawing on integrated threat
theory (ITT), Stephan et al. (2000) found that an integrated
system of four threats predicts negative attitudes toward
outgroups: realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup
anxiety and negative stereotypes. The theory was revised in
2002 synthetizing the four components into two basic types:
symbolic and realistic threats (Stephan and Renfro, 2002).
In general, a symbolic threat captures the perception that
an out-group has different cultural worldviews than the in-
group (Sears and Kinder, 1981) and a realistic (or material)
threat refers to the threat that an out-group poses to in-group
resources (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). While these types of
threats can be experimentally distinguished, in the real world,
immigration and economic hardships are often interlinked
and encompass multiple dimensions. That is, perceived
immigration threat usually encompasses realistic and symbolic
threats, as well as a threat to personal safety when people
perceive immigration to be associated with increased crime
(McLaren and Johnson, 2007).
Despite this relatively large body of research on factors
associated with Euroscepticism, the literature has so far failed
to take into account, in the context of other existing perceived
threats, the effect of a potentially highly significant perceived
threat that has become prominent in Europe: the perceived
threat of terrorism. We test here whether the perceived terrorism
threat is a distinct predictor of Euroscepticism above and beyond
other perceived threats. We next describe existing research that
supports this proposition.
Perceived Terrorism Threat
Research from the United States shows that perceived terrorism
threat is associated with hawkish political attitudes (such as
support for restrictive domestic policies or aggressive foreign
policies) across partisan lines, even when taking into account
individual characteristics, such as religious rites and attendance
at places of worship (Huddy et al., 2005; Gadarian, 2010,
2014). For example, Gadarian (2014) found that exposure to
terrorism imagery enhanced candidate evaluations and increased
approval for President Bush even among Democrats. Huddy et al.
(2005) found that terrorism threat perception increases support
for surveillance of Arab Americans, security checks for Arab
visitors and greater restrictions on visas. Although sometimes
terrorism is linked to religious conflict in popular media and
public discourse (especially in the current context of the high
perceived threat from terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIL,
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), these findings suggest
that terrorism threat does not exclusively trigger anti-religious
minority group sentiment and out-group aggression in the form
of religious intolerance, but also influences more general political
attitudes such as policy preferences and support for political
leaders. Thus, perceived terrorism threat appears to be a distinct
concept that goes beyond political and religious orientations.
Perceived terrorism threat was also found to be associated
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with punitive and aggressive worldviews, ethnocentrism, and
rally effects [i.e., a short term increase in popular support
for the President in times of crisis, Hetherington and Nelson
(2003), Ladd (2007)].
In the European context, there is abundant cross-sectional
evidence about the relationship between perceived terrorism
threat and negative views of immigrants (e.g., Uenal, 2016),
but more contradicting experimental evidence. For example, a
quasi-experimental study conducted in Spain before and after the
terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) provided findings
consistent with the research conducted in the United States,
that is, the attacks increased prejudice against out-groups (i.e.,
Arabs and Jews in this study), authoritarianism, and attachment
to reactionary and conservative values (Echebarria-Echabe and
Emilia, 2006). Conversely, two studies measuring attitudes before
and after the Paris 2015 attacks (Castanho Silva, 2018) and
the 2016 Berlin attacks (Larsen et al., 2019) found no effects
of terrorist attacks on attitudes to migrants, policy preferences
on migration, xenophobia, and other political attitudes. An
experimental study conducted in Italy found that increased
perceived terrorism threat from ISIL, triggered through reading
a newspaper article about the terrorist group’s threats to the
Vatican, makes Italian Catholics more supportive of conservative
political leaders, and more supportive of politicians stating
that in Italy “there is no space for Mosques” (Vergani and
Tacchi, 2016, p. 1894). Four experimental studies conducted
in Germany found that terrorism salience leads to increased
system-justification, with a medium average effect size (d = 0.47)
(Ullrich and Cohrs, 2007). Yet, no research has looked at the
relationship between perceived terrorism threat and political
attitudes in the context of other factors such as immigration
and economic threats. We expect that perceived terrorism
threat will be strongly associated with material (economic)
and symbolic (immigration) threats, especially in the European
political context. In this article, we empirically investigate
this relationship.
We acknowledge that terrorism is a multidimensional source
of perceived threats that can also be associated with both symbolic
threats and material concerns (Oswald, 2005). We propose
that terrorism encompasses two distinctive dimensions, namely
personal safety threat and existential threat. The evidence for a
personal safety threat dimension is evident in the findings that
personal safety issues, which were consistently associated with
anti-Arab attitudes, were a significant concern for participants
following the 9/11 attacks (Oswald, 2005). The existential
threat dimension is derived from terror management theory,
where research shows that any reminders of terrorism heighten
existential concerns (Pyszczynski et al., 2003), that in turn activate
a striving for self-esteem and the need for world defense in the
form of increased support for conservative and security-oriented
political leaders (Landau et al., 2004), and support for extreme
military force and restrictive domestic policies (Pyszczynski
et al., 2006). Drawing on these findings, we anticipate that
perceived terrorism threat is likely to contribute to models
predicting Euroscepticism, over and above other types of threat
and other relevant predictors. We tested this proposition in two
studies, as follows.
STUDY 1
To examine the relationship between perceived terrorism
threat and Euroscepticism that includes other types of
threat and predictors, we analyzed data collected by two
Eurobarometer surveys: Eurobarometer 81.4 (May–June 2014)
and Eurobarometer 83.3 (May 2015). The two surveys samples
are residents of each EU member state aged 15 years and
over, with a sample size of 26,540 (2014) and 26,214 (2015).
The survey questionnaires contain questions that enable the
construction of proxy measures relating to the perceived threat
of terrorism, immigration and economic hardship, as well as
negative attitudes toward the EU.
Measures
We created comparable measures of perceived terrorism,
immigration and economic threats by combining the answers to
the following questions: “What do you think are the two most
important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” or
“What do you think are the two most important issues facing
our Community at the moment?”; “Personally, what are the two
most important issues you are facing at the moment?”; “What
do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU
at the moment?”
To answer these questions, participants could select two
answers from a list of 13 options, among which are “terrorism,”
“immigration,” and “economic situation.” We created three
different measures by recording the responses to these questions:
(1) An index of perceived terrorism threat, obtained by adding
each participant’s selection of the choice “terrorism” in any
of the answers to the questions above (0 mentions = 0
of “terrorism” in the answers to the questions above, 1
mention = 1; 2 mentions = 2; 3 mentions = 3);
(2) An index of perceived immigration threat, obtained
by adding each participant’s selection of the choice
“immigration” (see above); and
(3) An index of perceived economic threat, obtained by
adding each participant’s selection of the choice “economic
situation” (see above).
Each measure has four different levels, corresponding to
zero, one, two, and three instances where the words “terrorism,”
“immigration,” and “economic situation” are selected as answers
to the questions above.
To capture negative attitudes toward the EU, we used the
question: “What does the EU mean to you personally?” To answer
this question, participants could select from a list of 14 possible
answers, among which are: “Unemployment,” “Waste of money,”
“Loss of our cultural identity,” “More crime,” and “Not enough
control at external borders.” We created the measure by assigning
one point to each instance where any of those negative statements
were selected, and zero for no instances, and then we combined
the answers by adding the scores. The measure had six levels
corresponding to zero, one, two, three, four, and five instances
where negative connotations attributed to the EU were selected.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1880
fpsyg-10-01880 August 13, 2019 Time: 16:7 # 4
Vergani et al. Euroscepticism and Threat
We expect perceived terrorism threat to be linked to
respondents’ agreement with those negative statements attributed
to the EU because terrorism threat encompasses a threat to
personal safety (related to the fear of crime and support for
stricter border control), a symbolic threat (related to the loss of
cultural identity), and a material threat (related to unemployment
and loss of resources). We also expect that there will be overlaps
between the measures of terrorism threat, immigration and
economic threat, because they all tap into both symbolic and
material threats.
We also extracted basic demographic and ideological variables
to be used as controls, specifically age, gender and political
ideology (i.e., “In political matters people talk of the left and the
right. How would you place your views on this scale?” Answers
range from 1 = “left” to 10 = “right”).
Results
To test whether terrorism threat contributes to models predicting
negative attitudes toward the EU over and above other types of
threat and other relevant predictors, we conducted both bivariate
correlations between the main variables of interest (negative
attitudes to the EU and perceived economic, immigration and
terrorism threats) and hierarchical OLS regressions. In the
regression models in the first block we included the control
variables (gender, age and political ideology); in the second step
the proxy measures of economic and immigration threats, and in
the third step the measure of perceived terrorism threat (Table 1).
The bivariate correlations show that, in the 2014 sample,
negative attitudes to the EU are significantly associated with
economic threat (r = −0.02, p < 0.00), immigration threat
TABLE 1 | Standardized regression coefficients on negative attitudes to the EU
(higher values mean higher negative associations with the EU).
2014 2015
Age 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
Gender (female) −0.02∗∗ −0.01
Political ideology −0.00 0.00
Block 1 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02
Age 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Gender (female) −0.02∗∗ −0.01
Political ideology −0.01 −0.00
Economic threat −0.01 0.00
Immigration threat 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Block 2 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03
Age 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Gender (female) −0.02∗∗ −0.01
Political ideology −0.01 −0.00
Economic threat −0.01 0.00
Immigration threat 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Terrorism threat 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Block 3 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03
Block 3 F-value 149.844 130.718
Sample size 26540 26214
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
(r = 0.13, p < 0.00) and terrorism threat (r = 0.02, p < 0.00).
In 2015, negative attitudes to the EU are significantly associated
with immigration threat (r = 0.11, p < 0.00 and terrorism
threat (r = 0.03, p < 0.00), but not with economic threat
(r = −0.01, p = 0.06).
As illustrated in Table 1, perceived terrorism threat does add
variance above and beyond immigration and economic threat.
The variance explained is greater than political ideology or
economic threat, yet the size of the effect is small.
To test whether the perceived threat of terrorism consistently
predicts negative attitudes toward the EU at country levels, we
conducted OLS regressions for each country sample, and we
plotted the unstandardized coefficient and confidence intervals
(x-axis), highlighting the significant coefficients with green for
significant negative, and blue for significant positive predictors
(Figures 1, 2). Red bars indicate non-significant associations,
blue significant and positive associations, and green significant
and negative associations.
In 2014, more negative attitudes toward the EU were
significantly associated with higher terrorism threat perception in
Slovakia, Macedonia, Ireland, Great Britain, Finland, and Cyprus
TCC, whereas in Italy less negative attitudes to the EU were
associated with higher terrorism threat. It is worth noting that
the confidence intervals are large in almost all countries, and
the relationship between perceived terrorism threat and attitudes
toward the EU is not statistically significant for most countries.
In 2015, more negative attitudes to the EU were significantly
associated with higher perceived terrorism threat in Turkey,
Sweden, Poland, Montenegro, Hungary, and Estonia, whereas in
Romania and Italy there was a statistically significant association
between less negative attitudes to the EU and higher perceived
terrorism threat. Also in 2015, the relationship between terrorism
threat and attitudes to the EU was not statistically significant
for most countries.
Perceived terrorism threat was a significant predictor of
negative attitudes toward the EU over and above other types
of threat and other relevant predictors in six countries in
2014 (Slovakia, Macedonia, Ireland, Great Britain, Finland, and
Cyprus) and seven countries in 2015 (Turkey, Sweden, Poland,
United Kingdom, Montenegro, Hungary, Estonia). Remarkably,
perceived terrorism threat was associated with positive attitudes
to the EU in Italy (in 2014 and 2015) and in Romania (in 2015).
Discussion
The regression models on the whole Eurobarometer sample show
that the perceived threat of terrorism has a small positive effect
on the negative attitudes toward the EU above and beyond the
effect of immigration and economic threats and other basic
control variables. The reason why the effect is small could be
due to key contextual differences across countries. Although the
relationships between perceived terrorism threat and negative
attitudes toward the EU change to some degree from year to year,
and the confidence intervals can be large (making it unreliable
to make claim about specific country level differences) – we
note an increasing trend toward a higher number of countries
being Eurosceptic. Nonetheless, there are also countries like Italy
and Romania where being pro-EU is associated with a higher
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FIGURE 1 | Unstandardized B and confidence intervals of the terrorism threat coefficient predicting negative attitudes toward the EU, controlling for age, gender,
political orientation, realistic, and symbolic threats. Data: Eurobarometer 2014.
terrorism threat. Data from the most recent Eurobarometer (85.2,
May 2016), indicates that significant diversity in the relationship
between perceived terrorism threat and negative views of the
EU across countries has been sustained (see Supplementary
Materials for the analysis of the 2016 Eurobarometer data).
In Study 1, the proxy measures of perceived threat can
be seen as relatively imprecise and do not allow for further
investigation of the country differences and the relationships with
other relevant predictors of Euroscepticism. A higher number of
instances where negative associations with the EU are mentioned
do not equate to how strongly participants feel about each of
these negative attitudes, i.e., the measure of negative attitudes
toward the EU and any perceived threat do not capture the
strength of the participants’ attitudes. Moreover, as participants
cannot indicate more than two types of threat per category, it
is impossible to have high values on all types of threat. This on
the one hand limits respondents to indicate to perceive threat
from multiple sources, on the other hand forces respondents to
rank threats in order to identify the most salient ones. As the
Eurobarometer does not provide any other proxy measure of
perceived threat, we decided to investigate country differences
in a second study, where we collected data using more accurate
measures of perceived threat and more accurate predictors
of Euroscepticism. We decided to incorporate experimental
manipulations into our survey (which will be described in the
next section), to test whether we could establish a causal link
between perceived terrorism threat and negative attitudes toward
the EU. Additionally, we wanted to measure Euroscepticism in
terms of both support for Eurosceptic parties and support for
Eurosceptic policies (with no mention of political parties), in
order to have a clearer understanding of the relationship between
perceived terrorism threat and political attitudes toward the EU
versus national political parties.
STUDY 2
To ensure a broad representation of the different relationships
between perceived terrorism threat and negative attitudes toward
the EU, as emerged from Study 1, we collected data from four
EU countries: United Kingdom (N = 197), France (N = 164),
Italy (N = 312), and Romania (N = 144). In Study 1, we
found that the relationship between terrorism threat and negative
attitudes toward the EU were either negative or non-significant
in Italy and Romania, or either positive or non-significant in
Great Britain and France. Moreover, by including data from
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FIGURE 2 | Unstandardized B and confidence intervals of the terrorism threat coefficient (x-axis) predicting negative attitudes toward the EU, controlling for age,
gender, political orientation, realistic, and symbolic threats. Data: Eurobarometer 2015. Red bars indicate non-significant associations, blue significant and positive
associations, and green significant and negative associations.
both Western and Eastern European countries, we expected to
include a variety of contexts that well represent the diversity that
emerged from Study 1.
According to the Standard Eurobarometer 83, which
presented data collected in May 2015 (from the official data
collection), Romanian citizens’ trust in the European Union
was 68%, in Italy it was 36%, 32% in France and 29% in the
United Kingdom. This data highlights the crisis the EU is
facing in terms of public opinion in two of the six founding
member states, Italy and France, and the United Kingdom is
one of seven nations that joined the Union in 1973. Diminished
trust in the EU has been associated with the economic crisis
in Europe and the rise of Eurosceptic parties such as the Lega
Nord in Italy, the UKIP in the United Kingdom and the Front
National in France. The Romanian context was different because
the country joined the EU in 2007 after a long transition, and
the EU has been viewed by the public there as a way out of
the hardships associated with the socialist past (Papadimitriou
and Phinnemore, 2008). Despite the different context and
historical relations with the EU, Romania has also seen the rise of
far-right parties such as Romania Mare, the main nationalist and
Eurosceptic populist party in the country.
We conducted Study 2 to examine the nature and
direction of the relationship between the perceived threat
of terrorism, Euroscepticism, and support for Eurosceptic
parties in the different contexts represented by Italy, France,
United Kingdom, and Romania.
Procedure
We collected web-based and paper-based questionnaires
from participants at universities in four countries in their
respective languages (English, French, Italian, and Romanian)
between February and June 2015. Written and informed
online consent was obtained from the study participants in
Italy, United Kingdom, and France. In Romania, where there
is no ethics process in place in universities for non-medical
research which involves human participants, our consent process
complied with the ethical standards of the university of the lead
researcher: the questionnaires were completely anonymous (no
identifying information was collected), and the participation
was completely voluntary (and participants were provided with
a plain language statement and made aware of opt-out consent
before starting the survey). To protect the complete anonymity
of participants and ensure their privacy, only opt-out consent
was obtained from participants. The informed consent of the
participants was implied through survey completion.
After collecting demographic information and measures of
political orientation and national identification, we randomly
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assigned participants to one control condition and two
experimental conditions where we manipulated the salience of
terrorism threat and respectively of economic threat:
(1) Terrorism threat condition – participants were asked to
answer two open-ended questions: “What sort of things do
you think about when you think about the Islamic State?
(The Islamic State is the rebel group that currently controls
territory in Iraq and Syria)” and “How does the thought of
a possible terrorist attack in [participant country] from the
Islamic State make you feel?”
(2) Economic threat condition – participants were asked to
answer two open-ended questions: “What sort of things
do you think about when you think about the economic
crisis?” and “How does the thought of future worsening
of the economic crisis in [participant country] make
you feel?”
(3) No threat (control) condition – participants were not asked
any questions.
Following the random allocation of participants to the
experimental conditions, they were asked to complete, as
manipulation checks measures of perceived threat (from
immigration, economic crisis and terrorism) and then measures
capturing the dependent variables (i.e., measures of support for
the EU and for Eurosceptic parties). We included the measure
of perceived immigration threat for consistency with Study 1,
and to control in the analysis whether the perceived threat of
terrorism affects Euroscepticism over and beyond the effects of
the perceived threat from immigrants.
Materials
We included questions for gender, age and their parents’
education. We did not include a question about the education
of the respondents because, as we collected questionnaires
among university students, we did not expect to obtain enough
variability in education. Specifically, we asked participants to
identify the highest level of education of each of their parents
(1 = primary, 2 = secondary, 3 = tertiary education), and we
computed a combined measure of the two scores.
To measure political orientation and national identity, we
included in our questionnaire a political orientation measure
(a scale from left-wing = 1 to right-wing = 10). Additionally,
we asked participants to rate on a scale of 1–4 their agreement
with the statement “Would you say you are proud to be from
[participant country]?” Previous research has suggested that
political orientation and national identity predict Euroscepticism
(Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Carey, 2002).
To capture identification with the EU, we used a 10 item scale
adapted from the group-level self-investment scale developed
by Leach et al. (2008): specifically, we included the solidarity
subscale (e.g., “I feel a bond with other Europeans”), the
satisfaction subscale (e.g., “I think that Europeans have a lot to
be proud of”) and the centrality subscale (e.g., “Being European
is an important part of how I see myself ”).
To capture perceived threat, we adapted seven items to
assess realistic and terrorism threat from Huddy et al. (2005).1
Additionally, we collected a measure of perceived threat from
immigrants, to test whether the perceived threat of terrorism
affects views of Euroscepticism over and above this variable.
Following previous research that used views of immigrants and
ethnic minorities as a proxy of symbolic threat (McLaren, 2003;
Lubbers and Jaspers, 2011), we asked participants to rate their
agreement on a scale of 1–4 with the following statements:
“Immigrants contribute a lot to our community,” “Legally
established immigrants from outside [participant country]
should be able to become naturalized easily,” and “The right to
asylum in [participant country] should be easier to obtain.”
To measure support for Eurosceptic parties, we asked
participants to rate on a scale of 1–4 their support for Eurosceptic
parties through the following item: “I support (Eurosceptic
party, e.g., [UKIP/Front National/Lega Nord/România Mare]
because it defends the people in [participant country] from
the invasion of immigrants” and “I support e.g., [UKIP/Front
National/Lega Nord/România Mare] because it wants to exit the
European Union.”
To measure negative attitudes toward the EU, we collected
participants’ agreement with one item that captured negative
attitudes toward the EU without mentioning any Eurosceptic
party: “Taking everything into consideration, people from
[participant country] would benefit from the exit of ([participant
country] from the European Union.” We consider this stimulus
to be an accurate measure of Euroscepticism, defined at its core as
opposition to the EU (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). We decided
to use this measure because we wanted to capture opposition to
the EU without politicizing the issue of Euroscepticism using the
name of a specific party, which could have created an ideological
rejection of the stimuli. See the Supplementary Materials for
the reports of the internal consistency of the combined measures
described above.
Results
Table 2 shows that there were differences between the
samples in terms of demographic characteristics. Participants
in the United Kingdom and Italy were slightly younger than
participants in France and Romania; however, we did not find any
significant correlation between age and other variables, therefore
we did not include age in the subsequent analyses (see correlation
tables in the Supplementary Materials). We also had fewer
women participants in the French sample (60.4% compared
to about 80% of females in the other country samples), and
participants’ parents were significantly more educated in the
United Kingdom and France compared to Italy and Romania.
These gender and education differences could be important in
explaining the sample’s support for Euroscepticism, and therefore
we accounted for them in the subsequent analyses.
Next, we conducted one-way ANOVA tests to assess whether
the manipulations affected threat perception and, consequently,
1The four items used to assess economic and terrorism threat are: “How concerned
are you that there will be a terrorist attack/economic crisis on [participant country]
soil in the near future?” and “How threatened do you personally feel from the
threat of terrorism/economic crisis in [participant country]?”
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TABLE 2 | Demographic characteristics of the samples.
United Kingdom
(N = 197)
France
(N = 164)
Italy
(N = 312)
Romania
(N = 144)
Age (mean, SD) 20.88 (3.30) 21.05
(2.85)
20.54
(3.58)
22.72
(2.07)
Females (%) 82.0 60.4 81.1 84.5
Parents’ education∗ 2.36 (0.39) 2.35 (0.66) 1.92 (0.64) 1.98 (0.56)
∗Primary = 1, secondary = 2, tertiary = 3.
views of Euroscepticism. As we tested multiple dependent
variables (i.e., three threat perceptions and two measures of
Euroscepticism) we reduced familywise error rate adopting
Bonferroni correction to reduce the probability of incurring type
I errors. The ANOVA tests yielded no significant differences
between groups in the experimental and control conditions
in the United Kingdom (all p-values above 0.15), Italy (all
p-values above 0.36), and in France (all p-values were above
0.52), except for the dependent variable capturing views of
the EU, for which participants in the terrorism condition
(M = 1.83, SD = 0.71) reported more negative views of
the EU compared to participants in the crisis (M = 2.05,
SD = 0.81) and control (M = 2.23, SD = 0.82) conditions,
F(2, 161) = 3.34, p = 0.04. This is not statistically significant
after adjusting the p-value to 0.025 (Bonferroni correction). In
the Romanian sample participants in the terrorism condition
reported higher terrorism threat perception (M = 2.49, SD = 0.71)
than participants in the crisis (M = 2.14, SD = 0.77) and
control conditions (M = 2.18, SD = 0.68), F(2,141) = 3.18,
p = 0.04. Additionally, participants in the crisis condition
reported lower crisis threat perception (M = 2.44, SD = 0.86)
than participants in the terrorism (M = 2.86, SD = 0.77) and
control condition (M = 2.70, SD = 0.72), F(2,141) = 3.44,
p = 0.04. This is not statistically significant after adjusting the
p-value to 0.025 (Bonferroni correction) and (in the case of
crisis threat) also theory inconsistent. We cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the manipulation did not provoke any
change in the participants’ threat perceptions and attitudes
toward the EU, therefore we collapsed the independent groups
and conducted OLS regression analyses controlling for the
experimental treatments.
In the first block, we include gender, parents’ education,
national identity, political ideology, and European identity.
In the second block we include the manipulations (terrorism
and economic threat manipulations), and in the last block we
included the three measures of threat (economic, immigration
and terrorism threats) to control for their sporadic effects.
The models illustrated in Table 3 show that immigration
threat is the most important predictor of support for Eurosceptic
parties. The perceived threat of terrorism is positively associated
with support for Eurosceptic parties in the United Kingdom
and Romania, but not in Italy and France. Economic threat
is not associated with support for Eurosceptic parties. The
models in Table 4 show that perceived terrorism threat was
positively associated with Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom
and Romanian samples, and immigration threat is associated
with support for Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom and
Italian samples.
Discussion
Making terrorism and economic threats salient did not, in itself,
increase support for Euroscepticism in any of the countries. In
fact, the only significant effect from either manipulation was
that support for Eurosceptic political parties was reduced in
Romania by making the economic crisis more noticeable. This
effect can be explained by the fact that the EU is seen as having a
protective role in the event of economic threat in the Romanian
sample. A post hoc power analysis revealed that a sample of
approximately 118 would be needed to obtain statistical power
at the recommended 0.80 level (Cohen, 1988) to detect an effect
of 0.25 size. We are therefore confident that our sample size
of 197 people (France), 164 (United Kingdom), 312 (Italy),
and 144 (Romania) was large enough to detect the effect of
the manipulations.
These zero effects were not anticipated, but they are
noteworthy nevertheless. Given the unique socio-political climate
at the time of data collection (i.e., heightened concerns about
terrorism in principal but also about the economic crisis in
Europe, especially in France where the data was collected a few
months after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, which could have led
to concerns about political efforts to exploit terrorism fears),
it is possible that our samples were particularly resistant to
political manipulation. Regardless, from a moral point of view,
given increasing concerns about the political use of “push
polling” (i.e., priming reactions by asking specific questions about
candidates and policies) raised in relation to the United Kingdom
referendum to leave the EU, these zero findings are reassuring
because they show that European citizens are resistant to such
manipulations (Crick, 2016).
Stronger perceptions of terrorism threat were associated with
higher support for Eurosceptic parties, but not in all countries.
Specifically, we found that perceived terrorism threat predicted
increased support for Eurosceptic parties and negative attitudes
to the EU in the United Kingdom and Romania, but not in
France and Italy.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The key aim of this article was to investigate whether perceived
terrorism threat contributes to models explaining support for
Eurosceptic parties and Euroscepticism above and beyond other
relevant variables that have been explored in previous research.
Our analyses provided limited support for this hypothesis.
Judging by the size of the regression coefficients in both Studies 1
and 2, terrorism threat is a smaller predictor of Euroscepticism
than the perceived threat of immigration. The small effect of
terrorism threat is present over and above the effect of other
threats that are well-established predictors of out-group attitudes,
such as immigration and economic threats. Yet, this effect is not
consistently found across country samples.
This finding adds to the current literature about the role of
perceived threat in explaining political attitudes. The perceived
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TABLE 3 | Standardized regression coefficients on the support for Eurosceptic parties (higher values mean higher support for Eurosceptic parties).
United Kingdom (N = 197) France (N = 164) Italy (N = 312) Romania (N = 144) Full sample (N = 817)
Gender (female) 0.02 0.05 −0.05 0.06 0.06
Parents’ education −0.03 −0.20∗ −0.03 −0.06 −0.14∗∗∗
National pride 0.26∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.00 0.21∗ 0.10∗∗
Political ideology 0.21∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.13 0.35∗∗∗
EU identity −0.24∗∗ −0.10 −0.20∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.09∗∗
Block 1 Adjusted R2 0.18 0.12 0.28 0.03 0.17
Gender (female) 0.02 0.05 −0.04 0.07 0.06
Parents’ education −0.03 −0.20∗ −0.02 −0.06 −0.14∗∗∗
National pride 0.26∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.00 0.21∗ 0.10∗∗
Political ideology 0.21∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.11 0.35∗∗∗
EU identity −0.23∗∗ −0.11 −0.20∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.09∗∗
Crisis manipulation 0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.19∗ −0.06
ISIS manipulation −0.02 −0.02 −0.08 0.03 −0.06
Block 2 Adjusted R2 0.17 0.11 0.28 0.06 0.17
Gender (female) −0.04 −0.02 −0.10∗ −0.01 −0.02
Parents’ education −0.02 −0.21∗∗ 0.00 −0.06 −0.07∗
National pride 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.00 0.22∗∗ 0.10∗∗
Political ideology 0.10 0.03 0.31∗∗∗ 0.08 0.23∗∗
EU identity −0.16∗ −0.10 −0.16∗∗ −0.08 −0.09∗∗
Crisis manipulation 0.00 −0.04 −0.04 −0.17 −0.03
ISIS manipulation −0.04 0.02 −0.08 −0.03 −0.03
Economic threat 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.14∗∗∗
Immigration threat 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.11 0.31∗∗∗
Terrorism threat 0.23∗∗ 0.03 0.09 0.29∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Block 3 Adjusted R2 0.33 0.24 0.41 0.14 0.326
Block 3 F-value 10.00 6.09 21.00 3.14 0.38.66
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.00.
threat of immigration, which encompasses both realistic and
symbolic threats, has a larger effect on attitudes to the
EU than the perceived threat of terrorism, which confirms
previous literature on the topic (McLaren and Johnson, 2007;
Pereira et al., 2009; Uenal, 2016). In this article we find
that terrorism threat has a small effect on political attitudes
over and above the effect of other threats, possibly because
of its impact on perceptions of personal safety (Oswald,
2005) and on existential concerns (Pyszczynski et al., 2003),
which the threat of terrorism makes more salient than the
threats of immigration and economic downturn. However,
we find that the effect is not consistent across countries.
The reason why the effect of terrorism perceived threat is
not consistently found across EU country contexts is that
both terrorism and the EU are complex and multifaceted
constructs that relate to in-group and out-group identities
in different ways. For example, in not all country contexts
Euroscepticism and support for Eurosceptic parties are consistent
with policy choices such as restrictions on immigration, strict
border control, increased surveillance of religious minorities
(especially Muslim minorities), which previous studies found
to be associated with higher perception of terrorism threat
(see for example Huddy et al., 2005; Uenal, 2016; Vergani
and Tacchi, 2016). Moreover, terrorism can be perceived
both as threat coming from outside the EU (for example,
from Middle East or Africa), and as a threat originating
from second generations of migrants who are EU citizens,
too. In some contexts the perception of terrorism threat
might trigger EU identity, and in others national identity,
depending on how terrorism is constructed in the media
and national discourse. This complex definition of identities
in relation to the perceived threat of terrorism and the EU
is likely to diversify the effect of terrorism perceived threat
on Euroscepticism to the extent of making it, on average
across the EU, small or negligible, but significant within many
country contexts.
Future research should test whether policy preferences
such as support for tougher immigration policies mediate the
relationship between the perception of terrorism threat and
support for Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic parties. If this
mediating relationship exists, it would explain why we see
varying results across different countries, as shown in Study 1,
where the relationship between terrorism threat and attitudes
toward the EU can be positive, negative, or non-significant, and
in Study 2, where a significant positive relationship between
perceived terrorism threat and Euroscepticism is present in the
United Kingdom and Romania, but not in Italy and France. It
is also possible that in Italy and in Romania, where there was a
relatively higher support for the EU than in other comparable
EU countries in 2014 and 2015, many citizens saw the EU as a
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TABLE 4 | Standardized regression coefficients on the support for Euroscepticism (higher values mean more Euroscepticism).
United Kingdom (N = 197) France (N = 164) Italy (N = 312) Romania (N = 144) Full sample (N = 817)
Gender (female) −0.04 −0.04 −0.10 0.09 −0.02
Parents’ education −0.10 0.00 −0.08 0.13 −0.12∗∗∗
National pride 0.21∗∗ −0.03 0.12∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Political ideology 0.13 0.16 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07 0.16∗∗∗
EU identity −0.31∗∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
Block 1 Adjusted R2 0.17 0.03 0.24 0.19 0.15
Gender (female) −0.05 −0.04 −0.09 0.09 −0.02
Parents’ education −0.10 0.00 −0.08 0.13 −0.12∗∗∗
National pride 0.20∗∗ −0.04 0.12∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Political ideology 0.13 0.16 0.20∗∗∗ 0.06 0.16∗∗∗
EU identity −0.30∗∗∗ −0.17 −0.42∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
Crisis manipulation 0.03 0.02 0.01 −0.09 −0.01
ISIS manipulation −0.06 −0.00 −0.05 0.06 −0.02
Block 2 Adjusted R2 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.19 0.15
Gender (female) −0.10 −0.07 −0.09 0.02 −0.05
Parents’ education −0.90 −0.00 −0.05 −0.12 −0.09∗∗
National pride 0.15∗ −0.07 0.12∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Political ideology 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.10∗∗
EU identity −0.27∗∗∗ −0.17 −0.38∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
Crisis manipulation 0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.00
ISIS manipulation −0.07 0.01 −0.04 0.02 −0.01
Economic threat −0.02 −0.30 0.04 0.10 0.05
Immigration threat 0.17∗ 0.17 0.28∗∗∗ 0.02 0.16∗∗∗
Terrorism threat 0.20∗ 0.09 −0.05 0.20∗ 0.03
Block 3 Adjusted R2 0.23 0.03 0.28 0.24 0.18
Block 3 F-value 6.45 1.55 12.58 5.22 18.02
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
protective shield from external threats such as economic crisis
and terrorism. In the same countries, the majority of citizens
with conservative ideology were likely to be voters of pro-EU
center right parties in 2014 and 2015. This could explain why
in Study 1 higher terrorism threat perception is associated with
less negative attitudes to the EU. Future research should test
this hypothesis.
One limitation is that the relationship between threat
perception and support for Euroscepticism that we found in the
representative Eurobarometer sample might be different across
age groups, which could explain why it might not be present in
the country samples of university students used in Study 2. This
is another hypothesis that should be studied in ad hoc studies with
larger samples and more nuanced measures of threat.
We propose that terrorism threat should be studied alongside
other sources of threat in comparative cross-nation research
to understand the causes of important political processes, such
as the Brexit vote in June 2016. A take-home message from
this research is that future studies of perceived terrorism threat
should be contextualized in specific national and cultural settings.
According to a socio-functional approach to threat (Cottrell and
Neuberg, 2005), terrorism threat will provoke different emotional
reactions that vary across groups, depending on the stereotypical
knowledge relevant to terrorism in a particular environment. For
example, terrorism could provoke a fear reaction and therefore
a desire to escape, in contrast to an anger response that would
result in a desire for aggression (Huddy et al., 2005).
The current study is the first to test the effects of
perceived terrorism threat on the support for Euroscepticism
and Eurosceptic parties with a comparative approach, using both
representative survey data (Eurobarometer) and convenience
samples from selected countries. However, it has limitations
because of the limited size of the samples in each country,
which does not allow us to test specific hypotheses on
subgroups, especially in the experimental studies. Moreover,
the questions about terrorism in the Eurobarometer survey do
not allow differentiating between components of the perception
of terrorism threat, such as personal versus national threat,
which have been shown to produce different policy responses
(Huddy et al., 2005). In our studies, we decided to use more
contextual measures of perceived threat, that is, the threat of
immigration, terrorism, and economic downfall. Terrorism and
economic downfall threaten people’s established way of life and
culture, which relates to symbolic aspects. All of these threats
are likely to capture, at least in part, symbolic and material
dimensions of threat.
Based on these findings, we suggest that terrorism threat
deserves to be further investigated alongside other threats that
have been so far considered in the literature, that is, perceived
threats brought about by immigration and economic hardship.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1880
fpsyg-10-01880 August 13, 2019 Time: 16:7 # 11
Vergani et al. Euroscepticism and Threat
In conclusion, our research demonstrates that the terrorism
threat should not be overlooked in research in the quest to
understand factors that drive Eurosceptic attitudes. In addition,
its relationship with political attitudes seems to be less linear
than might first be thought; therefore, future research needs
to be conducted to determine the contextual factors that cause
the terrorism threat, which results in different attitudinal and
behavioral responses.
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